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43AD The Landing Site
Academics have argued the cases for many landing sites, from the Isle of Wight in one direction to eastern Kent in the other, a span that covers half of the south coast of England. A recent symposium on this very subject failed to resolve the question, however, the tendency seems to be currently leaning towards three un-named sites in Sussex, which is hardly helpful. If Sussex was indeed the location of the landing beaches, then another question is posed, that of the forthcoming Battle of the Medway, more of which later. Without doubt the most popular, and accepted landing beaches, or harbours with writers, are on the east coast of Kent, north of Dover, but there remains almost nothing of their passing, almost nothing in the archaeological record to even suggest this area to be the correct one. It will remain, most likely, one of the hottest contended questions amongst historians and archaeologists, a question, which may never be resolved.
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All of the above is extrapolated from the words of Cassius Dio, and the small amount of archaeological data that has come to light in the past few years. There remains one momentous conjecture, what if the traditional translations of Dio are wrong. This must be investigated in order that any narrative might continue with any credibility what so ever. Only Dio provides any clues to the landing and subsequent events of the arrival of Aulus Plautius in 43 AD, consequently his exact words must be examined with the greatest of care. In the website www.rehistoriaeantiqua.co.uk just such an examination has been undertaken, and with some disquieting results. Briefly, what is explained is that there are two extant manuscripts of Dio’s Roman History, the Laurentianus and the Marcianus, and that these between them contain the greater part of books XXXVI to LX, finishing at LX, xxviii.iii. There are also three subsidiary manuscripts, the Vaticanus Graecus, the Parisinus, and the Mediceus, the latter of which includes the whole of book LX while also being the original from which Parisinus was copied. Cassius Dio used Greek instead of Latin as the vehicle for his work, which allows for particular “fluidity and flexibility of Greek allows a full play on nuance…” The disquieting sentence of this follows soon after when the writer says “What seems to have happened in the extant translations of the Claudian invasion is that pre-conceived ideas have been allowed to influence the way the text [Dio’s] speaks to us. It has always been assumed that there was and invasion – ergo – there will be an invasion.” The piece continues “There were four legions detected in Britain, by the evidence of the historical and archaeological record shortly after AD 43, therefore, four legions came over with Aulus Plautius.” The same website goes on to suggest that the lack of any mention of the gathering of the legions, or the logistical support which such an enterprise would have demanded could indicate that the entire episode might have been forged not by Claudius, but by Plautius and Caesar’s representative – Narcissus between them. More will be made of that insight as this narrative continues, but enough for the moment to indicate just how tentative and speculative the whole actually is.
For the sake of this narrative, it will be assumed that the landing site was at Richborough by the Isle of Thanet, eastern Kent. There are many reasons why this location ‘works’, not least the presence of ‘Claudian’ ditches which currently survive for some small and rather ragged extent which were originally excavated by P. J. Bush-Fox. The debate concerning erosion along this coast line seems not to be resolved, but if there has been considerable erosion, then one academic at least suggests that the original ditched site enclosed an area of a rectangular enclosure 650m x 650m, an enclosure of 42 hectares, or, 105 acres, more than enough to accommodate the main invasion force. Frere’s ‘Britannia’ supports the Richborough conjecture as does Wacher’s ‘Roman Britain’ and Peddie’s ‘Conquest – The Roman Invasion of Britain’ together with several other works including naturally enough the guide books from the Richborough area. To reiterate, the Loeb translation of Dio states “They were sent over in three divisions, in order that they should not be hindered in landing – as might happen to a single force…” This has been taken by some to suggest that Plautius divided his force even before establishing a safe beach-head – or indeed – three. This goes against all military logic, more likely that the army was transported in three ‘waves’, the first to take, hold and fortify the beach-head for the safe arrival of the following two waves. Peddie continues further and states that unless the entire army intended to survive totally upon forage for their survival, then baggage and rations would have to have been transported together with mules sufficient to carry them. The number of required mules, together with muleteers he calculates to a minimum of 694 animals plus drivers on the first day, rising to 4,166 after the third day as lines of communication stretched further from the beach-head. He also calculates the rations for 35,000 men, allotting 3lbs per man per day to 105,000lbs or 4,7250 kilograms, fodder for animals to be added to this amount. His calculations for the number of ships necessary to transport a total of 45,373 men, 14,750 animals in one lift based on the assumption of one century of 80 men per ship amounts to 933. And of all this massive build up, logistical demands and movement on the Gallic shore (regardless of exacerbated problems caused by the delay of an almost mutinous army), Dio makes no mention, other than the previously mentioned mutiny. This apparent lack of logistical support, which would have been vital for any sea-bourn invasion (e.g. Operation Overlord – the Normandy landings of June 6th 1944), Plautius would have had to ensure fodder for his transport animals and arguably more importantly, rations for his fighting men and the civilian support workers for perhaps a minimum of three days. The amount of food-stuffs necessary to feed 50,000 men would have been considerable, and if Plautius was expecting to land on a hostile shore, then logic dictates that he must have taken sufficient supplies to last until a sea bridge could be established whereby his ships would be able to re-supply the army on a frequent and regular basis. The alternative was that the army intended to survive on whatever they could collect from the indigenous people of Kent. In other-words, plunder. Whether that population could have managed to support an invading army seems doubtful, but if one compares similar armies and tactics e.g. the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte in their many campaigns across Europe in the early 19th century, they too used plunder as a means of sustenance, and coped quite well. How local communities coped is less well documented, however, any food stuffs within the path of an invading army would have been commandeered from corn to cattle, from apples to fish, everything edible would have been taken. So it might well be therefore, that it was Plautius’ plan that the army support it’s self, and the only rations required were those which the men were able to carry for themselves, until such time as they could be replenished by either method, re-supply or plunder.
The selection of Richborough for the initial landing site is questionable, but that it soon developed into what can only be called – the Gateway to Britannia – cannot be in doubt. As archaeology has proved, it soon became an important port and harbour (mostly lost to erosion), but with a huge population for it’s time. It was the beginning terminus of one of the most important Roman highways, Watling Street, which ran from Richborough, to London, then on to the legionary fortress at Wroxeter on the mid-Welsh border.
That Claudius saw Richborough as somewhere special, somewhere requiring a massive monument to commemorate his invasion of Britain is attested by the foundations of a huge quadrifons, or monumental gate-way. This monument survives today only as foundations, but its sheer scale must be indicative of the symbolic significance of Richborough
There are also Roman finds from the time of Claudius at Dover immediately south, Lympne to the southwest, and Reculver to the north, all of which provide flanking cover for Richborough. Between them, these places fully defend the southeast corner of England. No other single area on the south coast is so well protected. This must be significant. To reiterate, for the sake of convenience, and this narrative, it will be assumed that Richborough (POTRVS RVTVPIAE) was the landing place for the legions and auxiliaries of Plautius.
by Corinne Mills and Richard Hayton
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